



## **EDITORIAL**

### **Editorial**

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Welcome to the third issue of the *Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy* of 2014. It is quite remarkable to think that we are already fast approaching the end of our second year of activity, and it is perhaps even more extraordinary to consider just how much the world has changed during that short time. The most striking shift, to my mind, appears to be the way in which borders are increasingly – and sometimes quite dramatically – being redrawn in many different places. In this editorial, I begin by reflecting on some of these broad patterns of change that have come to characterize our world, along with others that have more suddenly begun to make themselves felt, before pausing to outline the shape of this particular issue of the journal.

#### **REDRAWING BORDERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?**

The way that the unfolding crisis in the Middle East is perceived has shifted from concerns about toppling the Assad regime and maintaining the momentum of the Arab Spring, to a sudden fixation on the dramatic emergence of Islamic State (IS) which has brutally taken over swathes of Iraq and Syria, and prompted yet another Western military intervention. Despite coming to office on an anti-war ticket, President Obama is the fourth American leader in a row to have sanctioned air strikes in Iraq. On the borders of Turkey, we now have (another) potential refugee crisis, coming hard on the heels of yet more tragic violence between Israel and Palestine, along with the reassertion of military rule in Egypt. More broadly, it

seems to me that we are genuinely living through history: a history that is characterized by a redrawing of borders in the Middle East.

This is something that challenges us as both academics and practitioners, as it fundamentally collides with the notions that we hold dear, such as the relative permanence of states and their sovereignty. Indeed, many Western commentators and politicians have been keen to reject the idea that IS represents, as its preferred name suggests, 'a state', simply painting its leaders as little more than unthinking, ignorant, medieval zealots. Of course, this description captures a great deal of truth: some of the reports that have emerged of beheadings, sexual violence and even the enslavement of women and children, not to mention the brutal treatment meted out to minorities, are truly sickening. The United Nations has unsurprisingly been quite clear that much of what is occurring is tantamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.<sup>1</sup> The level of violence, in fact, seems to be beyond the pale for all but the most hardened extremists: even Al Qaeda has cut ties with IS, citing its 'notorious intractability'.<sup>2</sup>

However, this is also not the whole story. As unpalatable as it may be, our job as academics and analysts is to probe a little more deeply behind the blood-soaked headlines and moral outrage, and in turn attempt to consider some of the deeper implications: in this case the question of whether or not IS does, in fact, represent an emerging state. It strikes me that the answer to this question is actually considerably more vexed than many Western pundits, raised as they are on a simplistic diet of binary distinctions between good and evil, wish to admit, and it will likely remain so as long as any intervention is as half-hearted – in terms, that is, of not only a substantive military commitment, but also a well-thought-through and resourced long-term plan for the aftermath – as the present one appears to be. Uprooting a foe which is as extensively financed and armed with – in what is surely a dreadfully bitter irony – high-grade American military equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars purloined from the Iraqi army, would be difficult enough in any context. However, when that enemy has embedded itself deeply amidst the power vacuum caused by the broader collapse of two states, Iraq and Syria, one of which has been essentially in a state of post-traumatic shock for over 25 years (comprising at least two generations of desperately unfortunate, brutalized people),<sup>3</sup> where overlapping religious and ethnic identities are acute and sectarianism is rife, the prospects of any kind of initial success – even an illusory one that echoes George W.

Bush's imprudent 'mission accomplished' speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003 – appears remote, let alone a much longer-lasting settlement where meaningful state-building occurs. In sum, the deterioration of the Syrian and Iraqi nations may end up being so extensive that it will be impossible to put them back together again, at least in their previous form.

This is where the analysis returns to IS. As one observer has suggested, its leaders may indeed be zealots, but they are not fools: rather, they are 'jihadis with MBAs'.<sup>4</sup> Their media operation alone, as macabre as it may be, is highly sophisticated and effective. In the parts of Syria that they control, the power is apparently on, public services are running, taxes are being levied (or, depending on your view, extorted), and sharia law is being applied. Crucially, if enough people are pledging their allegiance, regardless of whether this is out of fear or favour, then it is quite plausible that IS will continue to further institutionalize itself. To use an infamous metaphor: if it looks like a state and quacks like a state, then it is quite possibly starting to become one.

Of course, we may also be overstating the power of IS. Perhaps, as some have argued, the organization is actually little more than a 'splinter group' of the most radical elements of various Sunni militias, albeit one with a keen grasp of social media that offers it an outsized ability to pump up the volume and generate fear.<sup>5</sup> As time elapses, we may see IS alienate more and more people on account of its sheer brutality, particularly in Sunni communities, and thereby lose legitimacy. We may discover that it is far less effective at waging conventional warfare than it is at engaging in *Blitzkrieg*, particularly as its many enemies increasingly train their guns collectively towards it, supported by a blanket of Western air power. Under heightened military pressure, then, it may easily collapse as quickly as it rose to prominence.

However, in some respects it does not really matter whether IS survives or not. The power vacuum in the region will still exist. Syria and Iraq will still be highly contested states, and the writ of Baghdad and Damascus will only stretch so far; significant parts of their territory and community will be ungoverned (and even ungovernable) from the capitals. More broadly, if we are seeing a genuine reshaping of the region, then it is Iran that remains the most likely beneficiary over the medium term. As some sections of the Iraqi and Syrian Sunni communities – most of whom have been locked out of political participation by the divisive politics of Assad and, until recently, al-Maliki respectively – find themselves under

the authority of IS, whether willingly or otherwise, it is plausible that their Shi'a counterparts will continue to look towards Tehran. The Iranian government is, in any case, increasingly looking like a critical ally for the West in the struggle against IS. The recent diplomatic rapprochement between the US, UK and Iran, along with the election of the reformist Hassan Rouhani as President, are both tentatively encouraging developments in this regard. Yet old habits also unfortunately die extremely hard: just as we went to press, Iran executed a man, Mohsen Amir-Aslani, for heresy.<sup>6</sup>

However these events unfold, very real question marks hang over whether or not Iraq especially, but Syria too, can survive into the future as viable states. As Patrick Cockburn suggested recently, when the US, Britain and others commenced the Iraq misadventure in 2003 the last thing they expected was the emergence of 'a jihadi state spanning northern Iraq and Syria run by a movement a hundred times bigger and much better organised than the al-Qaida of Osama bin Laden'.<sup>7</sup> Yet it is this with which they are now faced. Some kind of redrawing of borders in the Middle East now appears unavoidable. We might not like it, but it is quite conceivable that if and when the dust settles IS – or some variant of it - will find a position for itself at the eventual negotiating table. It barely needs saying that this is a terrifying prospect. But it is also *Realpolitik*.

## **EURASIA IN FLUX**

In Europe, the past two years have seen a shift from an almost exclusive pre-occupation with the global financial crisis, to the re-emergence of more traditional geopolitical concerns. There is no doubt that the financial crisis in the European periphery remains extremely troubling, not least for the Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese (among others) that have borne the brunt of the enduring, and, as Joseph Stiglitz quite rightly argued in a scathing op-ed recently, utterly unnecessary and ideologically inflicted depression of the past half-decade.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, many European policymakers have lately turned their attention to the potential redrawing of borders taking place throughout the continent. The Scottish referendum that took place in September 2014 represented a genuine festival of democracy as people across the country debated the future of their nation for months on end, and voted in record numbers. The result of the plebiscite was not, in the end, quite as close as it appeared that it might be in the days leading up to it, but there is no doubt that the UK underwent what

can only be described as a 'near-death experience'. Secessionists elsewhere in Europe have taken heart from the Scottish experience: Catalonia is planning its own referendum in November 2014, although at the time of writing it appears that the Spanish courts may have stopped it from taking place.

Despite these developments, the most striking contemporary shifts are probably those taking place to the east. After three decades of relative stability, Russia is now showing its teeth once more. Despite the rather hyperbolic commentary in sections of the Western media – with some even taking the rather glib and depressingly predictable choice to liken Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler – there is no doubt that Russian expansionism is potentially very troubling. As Michael Ignatieff argued recently, 'the lesson being inflicted on Ukraine' is about shoring up, as he sees it, the broadly illegitimate dominance of the Russian state over its immediate geopolitical space. Moreover, he suggests, Ukraine represents nothing less than the frontline 'where the battle for influence has been joined between the demoralized democracies of the West and the rising authoritarian archipelago of the East'.<sup>9</sup> From this perspective, what we have is a titanic struggle between fundamentally different perspectives – one open, the other rather more closed – regarding how we organize our societies: if this is not quite the kind of clash between two opposing worldviews that characterized the Cold War, it is something close to it. On this reading, increased Russian (and Chinese) influence over Eurasia represents something considerably more substantial than simply a localized conflagration, and potentially even a new pattern of authoritarian hegemony that carries a range of worrying inferences for the broader survival of liberal democracy.

However, my sense is that such a view overstates both the rationality and reach of Russian power (and, by implication, its Chinese equivalent). It is surely beyond simplistic to argue that either of these two vast, complex – almost civilizational – states and societies are monolithic autocracies of some kind; democratization, by definition, is an ongoing process that waxes and wanes according to a range of internal, external, and often quite sudden and unanticipated stimuli.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, at the very moment I was drafting this editorial, Hong Kong stunningly and surprisingly erupted in assertive and dramatic political protest. Just as few people predicted the onset of the Arab Spring or, of course, the global financial crisis, nobody can predict with any real confidence how this will pan out, and there are potentially a range of as-yet-

unknowable implications for the future political development of China and its 'One China, Two Systems' policy.

So, an alternative reading of the current upheaval in Ukraine might suggest that it is as much a clumsy – but nevertheless highly vicious – attempt by Moscow to shore up the borders of the state as it is an authentically imperial adventure of some kind. Indeed, the entire post-Cold War history of Russia, and especially Putin's continued centralization of power in the Kremlin, can only really be understood as a response to the twin collapse of both the Soviet Union *and* the *Soviet state* (two linked, but distinct processes) in the early 1990s.<sup>11</sup> Viewed in this way, the past two decades or so of Putinism – including the present crisis along Russia's southwestern border with Ukraine – have been as much about rebuilding a state that had essentially disintegrated before and during the chaos of the Yeltsin era, as they have anything else. To be able to govern over such an enormous country, this has necessarily involved the consolidation of power at the centre and with it the consequent reproduction of a variety of authoritarian tendencies.

## **THE CARIBBEAN IN A CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CHANGE**

Closer to home, we have also seen some fascinating developments of late. Our new Vice-Chancellor-elect at The University of the West Indies, Professor Sir Hilary Beckles, has recently made waves with his book, *Britain's Black Debt*, which called for the payment of reparations in recognition of the historical legacy of colonialism, slavery, and their associated ills.<sup>12</sup> Regardless of the ultimate success or otherwise of this initiative, there is little doubt that it has influenced: firstly, the agenda of regional bodies such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which has recently established a working group to explore both the proposals themselves and the region's strategy in potentially making a reparations claim; and, secondly, the agenda of the international media.<sup>13</sup>

Three other emergent issues that immediately spring to mind as carrying considerable importance for Caribbean diplomacy today are also worth briefly discussing here. First, in early September, the leaders of the world's small states met in Samoa for the SIDS+20 meeting. This is something that we discussed at length in this journal last year in our special Forum, where a number of observers looked forward to the kinds of outcomes that we might expect or hope to see.<sup>14</sup> Although there was a flurry of media commentary during and immediately after the conference, it is not

clear that the 'Pathway Document' that was produced from the meeting does, indeed, present a clear pathway to resolving the broader environmental and climate crisis with which many of the world's small islands are starkly faced.<sup>15</sup> Much more research and analysis needs to be put to the task of assessing the outcomes of the conference itself – beyond the wishful thinking, assertion and platitudes that tend to infect conference communiqués – as well as serious consideration of the options available to the world's small states. For what it is worth, my own view is that the picture is much bleaker than we often realize, as smaller countries such as those in the Caribbean are broadly powerless to deal with the wider problem of mitigating climate change, something that ultimately depends on major emitters radically and rapidly reducing their output of greenhouse gases.<sup>16</sup>

Second, the Ebola outbreak in parts of West Africa represents a terrifying example of the often-unexpected implications of an increasingly interconnected world. The lightning speed at which highly contagious diseases can spread to the far-flung corners of the globe surely challenges the way we think about questions of international relations, diplomacy, and human security. Non-traditional threats, moreover, do not simply come in the shape of human diseases. The pathogens that potentially threaten us can take many forms: just imagine the impact of a super-charged computer virus that spreads quickly across the internet, wiping out large quantities of data or rendering certain information systems inoperable; or even a plant-based infection that also spreads easily and destroys most of a particular staple food crop. In the banana-producing countries of the Caribbean, many have long worried about Panama disease, an extremely infectious virus that affects Cavendish bananas. But just imagine, for a moment, a world in which large parts of the global rice or wheat crop were suddenly wiped out by an unanticipated resistant strain of a new disease of some kind. Those countries that no longer produce many of their own staples, like the vast majority of places in the Caribbean, would have to contend with a disastrous collapse in available food and skyrocketing prices.<sup>17</sup> In sum, the health of our natural and social systems is often considerably more fragile than we think, particularly so in a world that is ever more integrated and interdependent.

Third, and almost unnoticed by much of the regional and international media, in mid-2014 Jamaica announced that it would be decriminalizing the personal possession of small amounts of

marijuana (or 'ganja' as it is known locally in the Caribbean). For some, this of course remains highly controversial. But it barely needs to be said that the so-called 'war on drugs' that has guided international narcotics policy in the past few decades has proven an unmitigated disaster. As is regularly noted by, amongst others, *The Economist*, and as became clear in the recently published report by the London School of Economics (LSE) Expert Group, the 'war' has fuelled the rise of mafias throughout many parts of the world - Latin America and the Caribbean included - bringing with them violence and social destruction as they battle to control what is, essentially, a largely unregulated trade.<sup>18</sup> Added to this there is the impact on creaking judicial and penal systems: by treating drug use as a criminal problem, rather than a health issue, courts are clogged up with unnecessary cases, and far too many people are senselessly and expensively incarcerated when, in fact, they would be better off in treatment programmes. Now that Jamaica has followed the lead of other enlightened countries, such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Uruguay - and even some individual states within the US - it will be interesting to see how the rest of the Caribbean, plus the wider Americas, chooses to respond.

## **THE CURRENT ISSUE**

This actually brings us nicely to the current issue of the journal. We begin with a detailed piece of original research by Suzette Haughton that addresses the extradition crisis that took hold of Jamaica in 2009. Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, an infamous drug trafficker and gun-runner, was finally sentenced to 23 years in Federal prison by a New York judge in 2012. However, three years previously, attempts to capture him precipitated a genuine crisis of the Jamaican state. In the ensuing violence, 76 people lost their lives. In the paper, Haughton analyses the response of the state with reference to broader debates in security studies, and specifically the notion of 'securitization'.

We follow this with a Forum that looks at the question of the future of the Group of 20 (G20). Perhaps one of the most intriguing signs of our time, at least in terms of global governance, is the way in which this body has risen to prominence in a comparatively short period. Yet it generally remains poorly understood, in terms of both remit and significance. This is a glaring oversight, for two reasons. One is that, for us in the Caribbean at least, we rarely think of the G20 as a key body influencing our politics, certainly when

compared to the WTO or the IMF. Yet it does enjoy competences that carry a range of implications for us, and many Caribbean countries, like the rest of the world's 'marginal majority' of states, are actually locked out of it.<sup>19</sup> Put another way, it is simultaneously an increasingly powerful *and* a deeply unrepresentative institution. The other reason is that, five years after the crisis and the rise to prominence of the G20, which occurred in large measure because of the impetus of George W. Bush in 2008 and Gordon Brown in 2009, now is as good a time as any to review its performance and thereby seek to better comprehend its significance. This is particularly so because this issue of the journal goes to press just in time for the November 2014 G20 Summit that is taking place in Brisbane, Australia. We have consequently sought to redress the balance somewhat by inviting five of the most eminent global commentators on G20 affairs to offer their diagnosis of where it is at and where it is (or should be) going.

We begin with John Kirton, who offers an undeniably upbeat reading of the successes of the institution. John's paper broadly frames the Forum as a whole, and he explains the long genesis of the G20 and its evolution over time. So, for those approaching the subject for the first time, it provides a wealth of detail about how, when and why it came into being, and how the range of issues with which it concerns itself, as well as its institutional structure have progressively developed. John argues that, in a context where its mandate has continuously widened and deepened, amidst a significant degree of global turbulence, the G20 has actually performed remarkably well and is gradually becoming a 'hub' around which other networks of global governance can orbit.

In our second paper, Amrita Narlikar offers a considerably more circumspect assessment. In fact, her view is very much that the gradual mutation of the body from an *ad hoc* meeting group into something that is gradually becoming more institutionalized at the apex of global governance is nothing less than 'an adverse step for all parties involved'. After detailing the reasons for this analysis – in particular the costs that are imposed on actors at multiple levels of the international system – Amrita suggests some ways in which the G20 might be rendered more relevant, particularly in policy terms, within the broader context of global economic governance.

Tony Payne's analysis in our third paper shares the view that the G20 is deficient in certain ways, and suggests that, although not without some successes, its performance has been disappointing overall. However, Tony's argument differs in that he stresses the

importance of what he calls ‘an effective, functioning G20’. Much of the literature that has been published over the past few years as the institution has risen to prominence has often emphasized the ‘steering’ function that it plays. However, it is rarely recognized just how important this actually is in a world beset by multiple crises, which are, moreover, occurring simultaneously. Drawing on the notion of the ‘Great Uncertainty’<sup>20</sup> – i.e. the idea that we are living through not simply a financial crisis, but also two others characterized by shifting economic power and an unfolding environmental calamity – Tony seeks to show how it is only with ‘substantial institutional reform’ that the G20 can fulfil its potential at the summit of global governance.

In our fourth paper of the Forum, Andrew Cooper takes something of a step back and assesses the picture of G20 governance through the prism of the emerging powers, and, especially, the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Andrew notes that, although these states – and other ‘rising’ or ‘middle’ powers – have generally been reticent about expending too much energy in seeking to influence the design or architecture of the institution itself, they have displayed much greater assertiveness when it comes to either hosting and shaping the character of summits or carving out new policy agendas. This kind of analysis speaks to broader debates in international studies about ‘norm entrepreneurs’. Such policy entrepreneurship on the part of rising powers is evident, Andrew argues, not only within the confines of G20 debates and agendas, but also in the establishment of ‘parallel institutional structures’, such as the BRICS as an increasingly formalized grouping itself, or its associated bodies such as the embryonic BRICS Bank.

The final paper of the forum points us towards the upcoming summit. The author, Mike Callaghan, is the Director of the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. Representing something of a bridge between the more optimistic and pessimistic analyses that have come out of the first four articles, Mike asks a very simple question: are international summits, such as the G20 meeting that his country is about to host, worth the effort? The answer is that, on the one hand, the process itself has become, as he calls it, ‘a large and expensive exercise’, something that is surely particularly evident from an Australian vantage point at present. Yet on the other hand, Mike also argues that, if the Brisbane summit manages to produce some genuinely substantial ‘headline outcomes’ (in the areas of trade and tax, in

particular) then the institution can quite plausibly move forward in a newly energized fashion.

## **BOOK REVIEWS**

We end this issue with our first batch of book reviews, something that we have been looking forward to for some time. In the future, we intend to keep publishing such reviews on a bi-annual basis in the March and September issues of the journal. Our reviews editor, Tavis Jules from Loyola University Chicago has spent the past few months soliciting both books and reviewers, and we are keen to receive suggestions for both. We are therefore actively soliciting volunteers from both academia (including MPhil and PhD students) and the policy world – and, indeed, private individuals with relevant expertise – to review books for us.

If you are interested in undertaking a review, all we ask is that you write an original, pithy (meaning approximately 800 words), and constructive analysis of the book at hand, which is predicated on a degree of expert knowledge of the issue under discussion. We also ask that you take no longer than 3-4 months to write the review once you have received the book, meeting the appropriate hard deadline, of which there are two per year: 1<sup>st</sup> February and 1<sup>st</sup> August. Please visit our website for a list of the books which are currently available and our review guidelines, and contact Tavis at [CJIRDbooks@luc.edu](mailto:CJIRDbooks@luc.edu) with a brief explanation of your relevant expertise and therefore suitability to undertake the review.

Moreover, if you are a recently published – or soon to be published - author and you would like to have your book reviewed in the journal, please ask your publisher to get in touch with us, and also let us know if you have someone in mind as a potential reviewer of the book. We are interested in reviewing any book that fits, however closely or tangentially, within the broad remit of the journal. Again, more details are available on our website.

## **SPECIAL CALLS FOR PAPERS**

In the previous issue of the journal, we issued four special calls for papers. These are all, broadly-speaking, Caribbean-focused. But this is not something that is prescriptive, and we are therefore keen to receive papers that take a wider perspective as well, as long as they speak, in some way, whether tangentially or otherwise, to the broad theme of the special issue. The calls are as follows:

- *The Future of Regional Integration in the Caribbean and Beyond* (Deadline for submissions October 31<sup>st</sup> 2014).
- *Enter the Dragon: China in the Contemporary Caribbean* (Deadline January 15<sup>th</sup> 2015).
- *New Directions in Caribbean Critical Thought: In Honour of Norman Girvan* (Deadline January 15<sup>th</sup> 2015).
- *Evolving Relations Between Cuba and the Wider Caribbean* (Deadline March 31<sup>st</sup> 2015).

Since the previous issue, we have also added one other special call for papers, the full details of which can be found both on our website and immediately after the contents page of the hard copy version of this issue of the journal:

- *Child Rights in the Caribbean*: a joint endeavor between the journal, UNICEF, the Caribbean Child Rights Observatory Network (CCRON) and CARICOM (Deadline March 31<sup>st</sup> 2015).

If you wish to submit papers for any of these calls, please see our website for further details, or contact us at [cjird@sta.uwi.edu](mailto:cjird@sta.uwi.edu)

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The Guardian, 'Syria and ISIS committing war crimes, says UN', London, 27<sup>th</sup> August 2014. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/27/syria-isis-war-crimes-united-nations-un>
- <sup>2</sup> Liz Sly, 'Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq', *Washington Post*, Washington, DC, 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2014. Available at: [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html)
- <sup>3</sup> For a couple of excellent accounts of the dark side of the Western intervention in Iraq from 2003 onwards, see Laurence Whitehead, 'Losing the "Force"? The "Dark Side" of Democratization after Iraq', *Democratization*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.215-42; and David Beetham, 'The contradictions of democratization by force: the case of Iraq', *Democratization*, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp.443-54.
- <sup>4</sup> Toby Dodge, cited in Jonathan Freedland, 'This Islamic State nightmare is not a holy war but an unholy mess', *The Guardian*, London, 8<sup>th</sup> August 2014. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/08/islamic-state-nightmare-not-holy-unholy-mess-iraq>

- <sup>5</sup> Ryan Chapin Mach, 'Is ISIS not as powerful as you think?', *Huffington Post*, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2014. Available at: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-chapin-mach/is-isis-not-as-powerful-a\\_b\\_5793966.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-chapin-mach/is-isis-not-as-powerful-a_b_5793966.html)
- <sup>6</sup> Saeed Kamali Dehghan, 'Iran executes man for heresy', *The Guardian*, 29<sup>th</sup> September 2014. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/iran-executes-man-heresy-mohsen-amir-aslani>
- <sup>7</sup> Patrick Cockburn, 'Isis consolidates', *London Review of Books*, Vol. 36, No. 16, 31<sup>st</sup> August 2014. Available at: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n16/patrick-cockburn/isis-consolidates>
- <sup>8</sup> See Joseph Stiglitz, 'Austerity has been an utter disaster for the Eurozone', *The Guardian*, London, 1<sup>st</sup> October 2014, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/oct/01/austerity-eurozone-disaster-joseph-stiglitz>. Furthermore, for two brilliant, detailed recent accounts of the crisis, see: Mark Blyth, *Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Andrew Gamble, *Crisis Without End? The Unravelling of Western Prosperity* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
- <sup>9</sup> Michael Ignatieff, 'Are the Authoritarians Winning?', *New York Review of Books*, New York, NY, 10<sup>th</sup> July 2014. Available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jul/10/are-authoritarians-winning?insrc=whc>
- <sup>10</sup> Jean Grugel and Matthew Louis Bishop, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition).
- <sup>11</sup> Richard Sakwa has written some fantastic books on this question. See, *inter alia*, *Power and Contradiction in Contemporary Russia* (London: Routledge, 2014); *The Crisis of Russian Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 2008).
- <sup>12</sup> Hilary McD Beckles, *Britain's Black Debt: Reparations for Slavery and Native Genocide* (Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2013).
- <sup>13</sup> This is something that I have written about myself. See Matthew L. Bishop, 'Reparations for Slavery?', *SPERI Comment*, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2014. Available at: <http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2014/03/20/reparations-slavery/>
- <sup>14</sup> See *The Caribbean Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy*, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2013.
- <sup>15</sup> See United Nations Conference on Small Island Developing States, *Small Island Developing States Accelerated Modalities of Action (Samoa Pathway)*, September 2014, available at: <http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1537>
- <sup>16</sup> Matthew Louis Bishop and Anthony Payne, 'Climate Change and the Future of Caribbean Development', *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 10, 2012, pp.1536-1553.
- <sup>17</sup> Philip McMichael and Mindi Schneider have discussed this issue in some depth with reference to Africa. They note how countries that undermine local food systems in favour of developing exports in luxury products (such as cut flowers or delicate vegetables that cannot be produced in a European winter) generate sufficient foreign exchange in the short run to finance imports of staples. However, when a shock hits and prices rise (and, in the case of globally traded food commodities, they usually do so very steeply) the impact locally can be debilitating, particularly if foreign exchange earnings are insufficient to cover the higher costs. This is intensified by the fact that local food systems have withered, and there is less locally produced food to go around. See Philip McMichael and Mindi Schneider, 'Food Security Politics and the Millennium Development Goals', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2011, pp.119-139.

- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, 'Ending the Drug Wars' (London: London School of Economics, May 2014). Available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/lse-ideas-drugs-report-final-web.pdf>; See also The Economist, 'Drugs Policy: A Turning Tide', London, 7<sup>th</sup> May 2014. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/05/drugs-policy>
- <sup>19</sup> Anthony Payne, 'How many Gs are there in "global governance" after the crisis? The perspectives of the "marginal majority" of the world's states', *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp.729-40.
- <sup>20</sup> See Colin Hay and Anthony Payne, 'The Great Uncertainty', *SPERI Paper No. 5*, Sheffield: Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, 2013. Available at: <http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SPERI-Paper-No.5-The-Great-Uncertainty-389KB.pdf>