ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE

A Stitch in Time Saves Caribbeanization: Meta-steering and Strategic Coordination in an Era of Caribbean Trans-Regionalism

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Abstract: This article sets out to theoretically explain the Caribbean Community’s (CARICOM) integrative stalemate. It argues that this needs to be studied in light of a changing regional, geographic, and geostrategic climate. A shift is occurring from ‘endogenous regionalism,’ which concentrates on the Caribbean’s historical past, to ‘exogenous regionalism,’ which focuses on creating a borderless Caribbean space and promotes Caribbeanization through the Caribbean Single Market (CSM), which came into force in 2006, and the stalemated Caribbean Single Economy (CSE). I argue that new trans-hemispheric relations are emerging and Caribbean regionalism is now both multi-centric—arising from actions in numerous places rather than a single center—and also multi-temporal. In this context, mature regionalism presages effective governance by focusing on deepening regional structures and institutional arrangements. I argue that trans-regionalism is a multidimensional process that moves away from the spill-over effects of trade policy harmonization and streamlines different political, security, economic, and cultural regimes. I conclude by suggesting that ‘meta-steering’ in the form of ‘strategic coordination’ or ‘first order response’ is but one way to perceive the paused regional project.

Keywords: Caribbeanization; Meta-steering; Trans-regional Regimes; CARICOM; Trans-regionalism
In this paper, I suggest that a novel proverbial expression—‘A stitch in time saves Caribbeanization’—accurately captures the fatality inherent within proclamations about the current state of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The consequence is that we have not discerned that the political project of Caribbean regionalism is currently gated, an important sign of which is a return to old protectionist measures, while the functional process of regionalization is actually thriving.¹ In other words, one needs to distinguish between de jure state-driven 'regionalism' and de facto market-driven 'regionalization'.² In this context, two binary schools of thought are emerging: on the one hand, ‘Caribphiles’ who assert that a politically integrated CARICOM is the way forward, and, on the other, ‘Caribsceptics’ who call for de-regionalization.³ However, both agree that a shift is occurring from ‘endogenous regionalism,’ which concentrates on the Caribbean’s historical past, to ‘exogenous regionalism,’ which focuses on creating a borderless Caribbean space and promotes Caribbeanization through the Caribbean Single Market (CSM), which came into force in 2006, and the stalemated Caribbean Single Economy (CSE).

The idea of Caribbeanization is not new. We can trace its heredities to numerous attempts at establishing ‘regional political projects,’⁴ dating back most notably to the Windward Island Federation from 1833 to 1958,⁵ the Leeward Islands Federation from 1671 to 1956, and the West Indian Federation from 1958 to 1961.⁶ In this line of succession, CARICOM has been successful at promoting production integration based on cooperation and solidarity among the small (and micro) economies of its members.⁷ While pure market-based integration has stalled, it has been resuscitated continually, with the latest defibrillation attempt applying the characteristics of open regionalism such as trade liberalization and structural diversification to increase production integration of goods, services, and capital.⁸ In other words, the movement towards ‘structured integration of production in the Region’ is aided by the governance mechanism of mature regionalism.⁹ In this paper, then, mature regionalism is seen as functioning on the legal basis of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. It is therefore defined as a governance mechanism and not as a political process, and it calls for deeper structures, rather than wider integrative efforts, in order to facilitate collective decision-making that ensures national legislative commitment to regional decisions and agreed-upon objectives.
I suggest that mature regionalism presages effective governance by focusing on deepening regional structures and institutional arrangements. This is different from earlier attempts at regional deepening, in that mature regionalism calls for the management of the integrated economic space, while open regionalism focuses on trade liberalization across all sectors. As such, I see mature regionalism as being driven by collaboration and cooperation at the ministerial level since several factors negate the implementation deficit of regional decisions at the national level.

Thus, I advance that a trinity of events categorizes the current implementation deficit or ‘Caribbean sclerosis’—i.e. the stagnation of Caribbean integration. This has occurred as member states are:

- mindful of multilateral agreements forcing them to extend trade liberalization;
- seeking additional preferential market access to facilitate new trade and investment requirements; and
- attentive towards reducing potential trade diversions caused by other agreements negotiated with third parties, such as the United States (US) and European Union (EU).

This article sets out to theoretically explain CARICOM’s integrative stalemate. It argues that this needs to be studied in light of a changing regional, geographic, and geostrategic climate. In essence, Caribbean leaders are using antiquated theoretical constructs to understand a relatively new phenomenon—that is, Caribbean regionalism has increasingly metamorphosed beyond its original conceptualization of integrated production to a common market and now into a prospective single, integrated economy. Using the idea of ‘first-order response’—meaning ‘strategic decisions about how to adjust to the emerging nature of the new regional political economy’—and the concept of ‘trans-regionalism’, I suggest that new trans-hemispheric relations are emerging. These are multidimensional forms of integration with different degrees of ‘regionness’. Also, I suggest that CARICOM is now engaged in trans-regional relations, which is why a reconceptualization of the spaces and scales across which it functions is necessary.

The problem with suggesting that the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) has paused is that the economic processes of integration have done so due to political implementation deficits. Yet this article notes that, while the monetary aspect of the integrative project has indeed paused, the ‘functional spaces’ are on track. In order to make this point, I draw on regime theory to provide a way of undressing the manifestations of the wide array of
interregional relations that exist today.\textsuperscript{15} The focus here is on the structural constraints actors face and their response. I also review the ways through which CARICOM has historically viewed regionalism and suggest that in an era of trans-regional interdependence, Caribbean regionalism is now both multi-centric—arising from actions in numerous places rather than a single center—and also multi-temporal, involving, what Bob Jessop calls ‘an ever increasing density and, hence, a more complex restructuring and re-articulation of temporalities and time horizons’\textsuperscript{16} across different scales that are ‘operationally autonomous but substantively interdependent systems’.\textsuperscript{17} I conclude by suggesting that ‘meta-steering’\textsuperscript{18} in the form of ‘strategic coordination’\textsuperscript{19} or ‘first order response’ is but one way to perceive the paused regional project.

\textbf{THE CHANGING HEMISPHERIC CLIMATE: FROM SUB-REGIONALISM TO TRANS-REGIONALISM}

A significant number of hemispheric agreements now define the shift from ‘government to governance’\textsuperscript{20} or ‘government to meta-governance (or, better, meta-steering)’\textsuperscript{21} In this era, which is frequently defined as ‘governing without governance’,\textsuperscript{22} CARICOM countries simultaneously participate in new hemispheric agreements while at the same time taking part in their own process, the CSME. These agreements are reinforcing trans-hemispheric relations, and forming new layers of dialogue and cooperation across Latin American and Caribbean countries. I suggest here that trans-regionalism is a multidimensional process that moves away from the spill-over effects of trade policy harmonization and streamlines different political, security, economic, and cultural regimes.

In spite of hemispheric peculiarities, an overall pattern of enlargement and amalgamation is bolstering regional as well as preferential trade agreements. Since more than half of current world trade takes place within actual or prospective regional trading agreements, trans-regionalism is a geostrategic exploit that takes political attention away from the multilateral issues dealt with in the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, as countries now belong to customs unions, economic blocs and have signed numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that have very different trade rules—typically being implemented across different periods—with both neighbouring countries and other blocs, FTAs
foster a range of phenomena: Cross-Regionalism; Transoceanic Agreements; Polilateralism; Competitive Regionalism; Additive Regionalism; or Regionalism Without Regions.

Several CARICOM members now have agreements with more than one ‘hub’, agreements that are anchored in legally binding rule-based commitments that advocate structural reforms and thus run counter to the aims and goals of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Trans-hemispheric and trans-regional relations differ from South-South regionalism in several ways. On the one hand, south-south regionalism is categorised by (i) trade-based regionalism and it is inward-orientated, (ii) regional trade agreements (RTAs), (iii) bipolarity, (iv) traffic reductions, and (v) south-south cooperation based on technical transfer. On the other hand, trans-regionalism is based on (i) cooperation and multilateral market-driven consensus, as exemplified, in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, (ii) multipolarity, and (iii) outward-oriented and driven by open regionalism. Thus, trans-regionalism can be seen as an archetypical first-order response to a changing global environment by subsuming elements of South-South regionalism (collaboration and cooperation) into its processes and procedures, and adding global ‘micro-networking links between various communities (government, business, civil societal).’ Moreover, the new global landscape that is dominated by ‘post-spaces’ also requires new and innovative forms of institutional and structural governance mechanisms. Put more properly, trans-regionalism is slowly becoming the new orthodoxy since the emerging and frontier markets are seeking effective policy instruments as they insert their national economies into an era of post-2015 development agenda, post-financial crisis and global recession, post-Ebola epidemic, and post-Arab Spring.

The Changing Face of Regional and Hemispheric Integration

The crusade towards clearer governance mechanisms to regulate CARICOM, as attempted in the Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development, is a standard strategic maneuverer by member states to move against the global trend by reaffirming statehood. As Jessop has discussed more broadly, such action by states does not cede their claim to sovereignty in the face of growing complex interdependence and [did not] seek to enhance their political
capacities by participating in hierarchic coordination mechanisms or devolving some activities to private institutions and actors, [that would] seek to shape and steer these mechanisms through meta-steering practices.  

In fact, the Rose Hall Declaration reaffirms that CARICOM is a community of sovereignty states, and continues to legitimize principles of ‘proportionality’ and ‘subsidiarity.’ The proportionality principle emphasises that ‘institutional arrangements devised for Community action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve’ actions specified in the Revised Treaty. The principle of subsidiarity, which supports the principle of proportionality, stipulates that regional acts ‘would not be pursued in cases where action by individual Member States is sufficient to achieve the specific goals of the Community’. In fact, later in the article, I argue that CARICOM’s function has been relegated to that of ‘strategic coordination’ in an era defined by ‘meta-steering’ (constitutional or institutional design) and the proliferation of new governance mechanisms (mature regionalism) across all of its core pillars (functional cooperation, economic integration, foreign policy coordination and security).

Historically, sub-regionalism in the form of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was accepted as part of the larger regional project as it did not threaten economic integration. Moreover, as the OECS has a functioning economic union and monetary coordination, it presents an example of how the larger Caribbean integrative project could function. In essence, sub-regionalism has been tolerated since it does not contradict the core principles of Caribbean integration in that six of the seven full members of the OECS are also members of the CSM. In 1994, when all of CARICOM’s members agreed to be members of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)—which was an extension of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—the future of neoliberalism and the ability of CARICOM countries to be integrated into the global market with the backing of this new trade powerhouse looked great until it was stalled.

Hemispherically, up until 2000, the regional political projects within Latin America and the Caribbean were separate and oriented along cultural, ethno-linguistic, and colonial geographic lines. This changed when Belize joined the Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA). In 2010, four years after the CSM formally came on-stream in 12 of 15 CARICOM countries, regional leaders increasingly perceived new ‘existential threats’ that
challenged the economic prosperity, food security, and ecological balance of integration projects.\(^{39}\) Guyana and Suriname joined the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which combined two existing customs unions, namely the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In 2011, 13 CARICOM states were among the 33 countries that signed the Declaration of Caracas, creating the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) with its focus on deeper integration.\(^{40}\) In 2012, Haiti, Suriname, and St Lucia acceded to the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), a socialist project of which numerous CARICOM members—Antigua-Barbuda, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines—had long been members.\(^{41}\) Additionally, CARICOM countries belong to other regional zones promoting economic cooperation: all are members of the Association of Caribbean States, and nine CARICOM countries belong to the *Sistema Económico Latin-American y del Caribe* (SELA).\(^{42}\) Then there are other projects such as PetroCaribe: a Venezuelan subsidized-credit scheme for oil now linked with ALBA, which accounts 12 of the 15 CARICOM members.\(^{43}\)

Coupled with this cross-pollination of political projects, new hemispheric initiatives—such as the Pacific Alliance, which links free-trading Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico together—are on the rise, just other movements are declining. A clear example is ALBA: a particular vision of Latin American integration is failing as the body’s influence wanes in the aftermath of the death of Hugo Chávez. In fact, the proliferation of regional bodies in Latin America and the Caribbean does not effect a more amalgamated region. Rather, it highlights how economic trading blocs are perceived as inefficient and governments are trying to keep their hands in all of the regional pies, so to speak.

This new faith in regionalism is a sign that governments are looking for safe havens in a period of protracted uncertainty and instability. Moreover, the retreat towards the regional level follows the patterns of the 1970s and 1980s that created the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, which focused on providing traffic reduction and trade benefits. As then, so too now, the changing global environment means that Caribbean regionalism will face its own ‘insurgences’ as questions around its legitimacy arise. Among a number of different factors, there is, in particular, a trinity of forces that are reshaping the region at the present moment.\(^{44}\) First, US foreign policy is now pivoting more towards Asia in the form of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) while the Caribbean is no
longer seen as having the geostrategic importance it once did. Second, China is slowly replacing America as the primary benefactor in the Caribbean as it continues to expand its influence via state lending, private investments, and outright gifts in the form of new stadiums, roads, official buildings and ports. At the same time, more Chinese nationals than ever are working and living in the region. Third, the conditionalities attached to the European Development Fund, now in its 10th cycle, and it linkages to the controversial Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) call for the abolishment of preferential trade rules.

The changing face of Caribbean integration is not only by choice. Rather, it is responding to a protracted global environment that is now defined by a retreat towards protectionism at the regional level or what has been called the rise of the ‘gated global’. In the case of CARICOM, this has invited speculations that it is an obsolete regional project. However, in light of our wider argument in the paper, the issue is not with CARICOM per se but with the ways in which we have sought to theorize it.

A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS

Historically, scholars have focused on CARICOM’s deficit of supranationalism owing to a form of inter-governmentalism that, as Vaughan Lewis put it,

recognises the continuing importance of individual member states in determining the path of the integration process, as well as to a neo-functionalism that is premised on the principle of shared sovereignty or the collective exercise of such sovereignty in specified areas.

In seeking to fuse inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism together, the founding fathers of Caribbean integration sought to guard against the larger nations taking advantage of the smaller ones. The idea was that Caribbean countries could hold on to their sovereignty while coordinating policy decisions when necessary. Since the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas did not change CARICOM’s modus operandi, this orthodoxy continues to dominate its institutional structures and modes of governance. A case in point is found in the decision-making processes of the organs of governance: the Conference of Heads of Government and the Council of Ministers, where decisions necessitate one vote per state and can be held to Prime Ministerial/Presidential ransom. Neo-
functionalism is a hybrid of functionalist and federalist theories that calls attention to the functional mechanisms and goals of a given integrative project. Mention of federalism in CARICOM invites unease among its members, given the disastrous failure of the West Indian Federation. Thus, CARICOM has maintained the mechanisms of neo-functionalism: 'technocratic decision-making, incremental change and learning processes'.

Because inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism are responsible for the Caribbean sclerosis, I maintain that trans-regionalism may provide an alternative way of studying—and theorizing—a Caribbean integration that is slowly being defined by multi-layered inter-regional relations with hemispheric roots. In other words, due to its hybrid nature, CARICOM governance mechanisms—i.e. mature regionalism—constitute a form of meta-steering built around structured and strategic coordination.

In the remainder of this section, I suggest that CARICOM should now be viewed as a trans-regional regime. I also show that trans-regionalism as a theoretical approach offers genuinely new insight into the regional processes and governance mechanisms that CARICOM is now involved in creating.

**CARICOM as a Trans-Regional Regime**

CARICOM has historically been defined not only by inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism as its formal praxis but also by its governance *modus operandi*, which is shaped by two principal organs: the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CHGCC) and its Bureau and the Community Council of Ministers (Community Council) that are assisted by four ‘Councils’ and three ‘Bodies’.

In defining CARICOM as a trans-regional regime, I first draw on Krasner’s conceptualization of a regime as ‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area.’ The defining feature of CARICOM in this regard stems from the fact that it is demarcated by its own self-interest, power, and member interactions. In describing it in this way, I acknowledge that CARICOM now operates in an era defined by institutional governance regulations that comprise all mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control, and balancing. These institutional regulations, which advocate discourse and agreement rather than authority and domination, are permanent features of the post-bureaucratic age. Open at
their boundaries, trans-regional regimes are horizontal networks of coordination rather than hierarchical entities. In essence, trans-regional regimes function in an era where decision-making has become flattened and stresses meta-decision-making rules instead of decision-making rules to urge participation and empowerment. For the post-bureaucratic regime, obligatory pronouncements are made at the level of strategy—that which unifies all parts of the system—consequently producing binding proclamations through this mechanism by demonstrating active collaboration with others.\textsuperscript{54}

Trans-regionalism is also a defining characteristic of new regionalism. While it has been applied comprehensively to describe the group-to-group dialogues of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework established in 1996, I suggest that inter-regional arrangements help us to understand why the ‘functional spaces’ of regionalization in CARICOM have succeeded while the monetary spaces suffer from disharmony. The plethora of interregional arrangements beyond the EU’s external relations is expanding globally. Examples include: ASME; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States; Europe-Latin America and Caribbean Summit; Africa-Europe Summit; Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation.\textsuperscript{55} Inter-regional or bi-regional group-to-group dialogues, another defining feature of new regionalism, is the core instrument that promotes intra-regional cooperation at the ministerial level in the form of meetings (high-level or technical) and the launching of joint projects and programs.\textsuperscript{56} Inter-regionalism challenges the notion of geographical proximity by recognizing that economic distance no longer is a defining facet of trade competitiveness.\textsuperscript{57} Unlike inter-regionalism—which is categorized by the ‘relationship between two distinct, separate regions’\textsuperscript{58} and defined by region-to-region dialogue to manage economic and political relations\textsuperscript{59}—‘trans-regionalism implies the establishment of common “spaces” between and across regions in which constituent agents (e.g. individuals, communities, organisations) operate and have close associative ties with each other’.\textsuperscript{60} Trans-regionalism builds upon concepts of networked governance\textsuperscript{61} by singling out a ‘set of formal and informal institutions that cut across and connect different geographical regions... through a combination of regional, inter-regional and bilateral norms and forums’.\textsuperscript{62}

Central to the understanding of trans-regionalism is the spatiality of functional projects (such as education, health, and
transportation) that are shaped by social relations and in turn constituted in spatio-temporal contexts. Thus, such projects within CARICOM have come to occupy spatio-temporal contexts that range from structural integration and strategic coordination—which again range from intersystemic, based on interorganizational negotiation, to interpersonal networking—for more or less all-inclusive regional goals, to the quest for definite CSM interests. Therefore, the Caribbean regional space is experiencing growing infiltration (inward flows) and extraversion (outward flows) as it moves away for trade-based regionalism and towards developing a single market that is expected to be supported by different regimes (the movement of goods, labour, capital, services and the right to establishment) across different spaces that are both regional and trans-regional.

Dent distinguishes between four categories of trans-regional spaces that are relevant to the understanding the changing nature of governance within CARICOM: (i) economic spaces—based on free trade areas and zones, customs unions and labor market rules that are part of the CSM; (ii) business spaces—analogous to economic spaces, but propelled by multinational enterprises that regulate the production and distribution systems; (iii) political spaces—overseen by supranational or inter-governmental bodies; and (iv) socio-cultural spaces—established over time based on common cultural identities. Although the four components of Dent’s taxonomy are relevant to the Caribbean, some might also reasonably assert that the economic and political spaces are in something of a holding pattern due to Caribbean sclerosis. If we are to concede that CARICOM now operates in a trans-regional space with inadequate trans-regional institutions and governance mechanisms, then we can plausibly acknowledge that the pausing of the CSM and lacklustre start of the CSE is instigated by structural inefficacies of a system-wide incapacity rather than a purely political determination. In other words, the novel network of entangled regional relations that are driven by economic transnationalism and open regionalism—in the form or production integration—is hard to discern. Thus, Caribbean trans-regionalism is based on the use of horizontal models of governance (i.e. mature regionalism) through ‘external governance’ that seek to bind member states into common policy frameworks.

Finally, CARICOM’s classification as a trans-regional regime speaks to how the rise of ‘third generation agreements’ are found in declarations like Rose Hall that call for deeper integration, which
by extension, will increasingly incorporate policy areas that were previously a domestic preserve. Since CARICOM members are now functioning across different spaces and scales, new institutional mechanisms are needed to facilitate the complexities that are arising at the systemic level since new domestic requirements are generating greater need for the management of multiple and varied commitments. Membership of different blocs implies the acceptance of highly differentiated trade rules that can be both complementary to, and in conflict with, CARICOM’s core mandate.

Therefore, we speak of a pausing of Caribbean integration as it necessitates that we differentiate between the systemic level complexities of the regional project itself and the rule-making requirements that undergird the processes of regional integration. Moreover, CARICOM’s characteristics of as a trans-regional regime also speak to the fact that it is no longer only responsible for bloc-to-super power negotiations—i.e. with the US or EU—but must also negotiate with other Southern blocs, including those of which some, many, or all of its members might be part.

In summary, CARICOM’s instrument of open regionalism and its governance mechanism of mature regionalism has given a very different form of integration to that found, for example, in Southeast Asia—which Jayasuriya calls ‘embedded mercantilism’. It is distinguished, at least in part, with its focus on ensuring that:

critical policy decisions of the Community taken by Heads of Government, or by other Organs of the Community, will have the force of law throughout the Region as a result of the operation of domestic legislation.

This in turn has paved the way for trans-regionalism. It implies that a new trans-regional space now exists since the two regional projects are concurrently strategically coordinating the spatio-temporal horizon in the Caribbean. In essence, the Caribbean space has been constructed around a hybrid instrumentality that implies that open regionalism and deeper integration (mature regionalism) must work simultaneously to spur national development through regional means, while considering that its members may have competing and conflicting interests since they are parties to other integrative blocs.
Something Old, Something New, Something Mature and Something Blue

The trans-regional space that I argue exists in CARICOM can also be viewed as a 'functional space'. This notion implies a space based on the coordination of governance, funding, provision, and regulation of the functional areas of regionalism, such as education and health. Against the backdrop of neoliberal capitalism, today's international system dictates that virtually all countries need to be members of at least one bloc as we have moved away from the protectionist and interventionist post–World War II system of closed or inwards regional modules—that used import substituting development in the form of the Common External Tariff [CET] as the basis for development—to a more open or outward model of regionalism, that gradually reduced external tariffs on goods from non-member countries, while preserving duty-free access on intra-regional trade.

CARICOM is fundamentally a product of the old regionalism of the 1960s and 1970s that was premised upon developing trade and dismantling tariffs with countries at more or less similar levels of development, geographic propensity and proximity. To support this form of preferential trading system, the Caribbean Common Market (CCM) was developed as an instrument within the parameters of 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas. As an instrument to stimulate national development, the CCM emphasized import-substituting industrialization, and, like several other blocs, it also experienced negligible implementation of its proposed policies. This implementation deficit and its stalemate was also driven by the four pestilences of the 1980s: the oil crisis of 1973/74 and the oil shock of 1977, along with the ensuing debt fatigue; the structural adjustment crises of the 1970s that led to public sector reforms in all of CARICOM’s member states; (the evaporation of the preferential market for Caribbean goods (sugar, rice, rum, and bananas); and the political fragmentation/ideological pluralism, that stymied economic integration. By the end of the 1980s, with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Caribbean leaders sought to renew ‘ideological and policy convergence among member states’ by calling for the revision of the ‘three Common Market Instruments required by the Treaty of Chaguaramas—the Common External Tariff, the Rules of Origin, and a Harmonised Scheme of Fiscal Incentives’ to facilitate the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME).
In order to re-conceptualize CARICOM as a trans-regional regime that needs to function in a trans-regional space, researchers must recognize that the current challenges that the ‘third wave of regionalism’ or the ‘new regionalism’ bring to the Caribbean basin are vastly different from those of the old regionalism—or even open regionalism—that dominated the agenda in the 1990s as the CSME was being conceived. In fact, new ways of thinking need to be developed that recognizes this, noting that while the name of the political project has changed the aim remains the same. Moreover, since the explicit call of Rose Hall Deceleration for deeper integration, CARICOM leaders have failed to take account of the fact the they are applying a new regional governance mechanism—i.e. mature regionalism—to a system that was built upon and around supporting open regionalism in the form of production integration. Above all, they have not acknowledged that, at the heart of new regionalism, is a drive for competitiveness, not simply between blocs but within them as well.

The new trend of reciprocal agreements encompassing large swaths of countries that fear exclusion has become a distinctive feature of the negotiated and regulated world that is governed by the WTO. New modes of regionalism are driven by a recognition that, ‘in addition reducing tariffs and quotas, effective integration requires the removal of other barriers, or what has come to be known as “deep integration”’. Yet regionalism—in the Caribbean, at least—is still viewed as something of a panacea for development.

**RETHINKING CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION**

Caribbean leaders may wish to train their focus on a different type of governance that adequately captures the complexities of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, while at the same time promoting open regionalism (as called for under Grand Anse) through the mechanism of mature regionalism. Such an approach would rely on the use of meta-governance (organization of self-organization) across spatio-temporal horizons and contexts.

Such an approach, which focuses on organizing and balancing different forms of coordination of complex reciprocal interdependence, has also been describe by Jessop as ‘meta-steering’, which means ‘the use of higher-order mechanisms to calibrate different modes of steering (markets, states and other forms of imperative coordination, networks)’. Meta-steering is not simply advanced here as a panacea for Caribbean integration but rather as
an instrument that may help to manage the complexity and plurality of ‘interdependencies without undermining the basic coherence and integrity of the (national) state’. When embedded in strategic coordination, meta-steering has the potential of ‘exploring how one operationally autonomous system can influence the operations of another such (relatively closed) system by altering the environment in which the latter reproduces itself and also examines how governance mechanisms might shape their joint evolution’. In other words, meta-steering is but one way of explaining how the Caribbean regional project can influence the operations of hemispheric regional groupings and the governance mechanisms involved.

The functional spaces within CARICOM have not only created successful institutions under close regionalism—such as the regional University of the West Indies and the West Indies Shipping Association—but in an era of new regionalism that glorifies trade liberalization, new institutions and programs have arisen as a consequence of ‘new mutualism’. Here, such new mutualism is seen as being premised upon deeper cooperation and coordination since it ‘operates as a policy way of thinking, acting, and being at the regional level’ and it is defined by three aspects: its multi-sectoral approach; the adoption of international targets; and the establishment of regional benchmarks. The point is that neo-functional or functional mechanisms of Caribbean regionalism continue to drive the economic dimensions. Thus, advances gained in the former, which are outside of the traditional institutional arrangements that are now a permanent feature of CARICOM, show that ‘cooperation on domestic policies can substantially increase the gains from forming a trade bloc’.

The free movement of Caribbean nationals has been clarified recently by the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)—an institution of new regionalism—in Myrie vs The State of Barbados, which determined that all CARICOM nationals have the right to travel freely within the Community with stays up to six months. There are only two exceptions: if a national is seen to be undesirable, or if the person is in danger of becoming a charge on the public purse. Consequently, the CCJ has given de jure credence to policy integration (in the form of intensified functional cooperation), which is the principal instrument of regional coordination, harmonization, and acceptance.

In the changing nature of globalization and regionalism, the small and micro-states of the Caribbean should be seen no longer
just as parts of regional blocs, but as parts of trans-regional hemispheric ones. If we accept this idea, it is not plausible to assert that Caribbean integration has paused in light of the post-financial crisis and global recession. Rather, we may think of CARICOM’s pause in going ahead with the monetary aspects of regionalism as a way to reconcile inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism on the one hand, and, on the other, two aspect that are not necessarily in conflict with each other: open regionalism, which aims at widening the community, and mature regionalism, which is geared towards deepening it.

What is required in this time of pause is treaty amendments aimed at establishing new pillars of inter-governmentalism more complementary to the wave of neo-functionalist cooperative endeavors. Conceptually, the CSME calls for the creation of a large market space to intensify competition as the community complies with the unilateral and multilateral commitments assumed under the WTO. Like everything else, CARICOM has been cautious in trying to keep its hands in all possible pies. While unilateralism is not a guarantee for CARICOM countries to receive reciprocity from other trading partners, multilateral liberalization provides security, but it is a lengthy process. In essence, Caribbean integration may now be categorized as a ‘labyrinth of exceptions and derogations’ that is besieged by rules of origin that conflict with the Treaty and impedes joint negotiating efforts with third countries.

As a consequence, new regional organizations are needed to establish cross-border supervision, since economic openness renders CARICOM economies vulnerable to external shocks caused, for example, by wild fluctuations in commodity prices. The problem is that while intra-regionalism is no longer the aim of CARICOM’s integrative project, it continues to function under a protective common market module that does not support the aims of the CSME, which calls for competitive production both intra- and extra-regionally as well as hemispherically. Thus, new questions will arise that will warrant the attention of the CCJ. For example, how will it address Treaty violations that may occur if a member state belongs to several hemispheric blocs with different implementation rules? Or, if CARICOM nationals move to a member state that is also a part of another bloc, what rules govern their movement and their right of establishment across a non-CARICOM country? Such questions require not only the re-thinking of the role and function of CARICOM’s integrative instruments but also a new way to conceptualize a CARICOM that is evolving in an era of dis-
harmonization, an ill-fated Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that has not delivered on its promise, along with sub-regional deepening and hemispheric widening.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR

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NOTES


5 This meant that Windward Islands and Tobago were under the control of the governor of Barbados.

6 The West Indian Federation was established under the British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956, with the aim of promoting stronger economic ties and establishing a political union among its 10 members – Antigua and Barbuda, Montserrat, the then St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (Leeward Islands), Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent (Windward Islands), Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago.

7 Historically, unlike market-based integration, production integration which privileged goods and to lesser extent services calls for an active state focused on integrating trade and production through industrial complexes and programing such as Caribbean Food Plan and the Caribbean Industrial Programming Scheme.


Earlier attempts at deeper regionalism saw deeper regionalism as a state-centered process that excluded non-state actors.


In employing regime theory the units of analysis that I use, states, are not viewed as being functional differentiated but structurally driven.


Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 334

Ibid.


Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 354
25 Used to justify why a country should conclude trade agreements with different countries and trade blocks (both geographically close and distant) simultaneously (see Luis De Sebastian ‘Trading Blocs and The Stranded Countries’ in Whither EU-Israel Relations?: Common and Divergent Interests, eds, Ephraim Ahiram and Alfred Tovias (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), 147-64.
27 Defined as country who negotiates bilateral free trade agreements with all of its significant trading partner (see Harrison et al., ‘Trade Policy Options for Chile,’ 49-79.
29 Tovias, ‘The Brave New World.’
35 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal,’ 323-360.
36 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal,’ 323-360.
37 While Montserrat is a founding member of CARICOM, it is also a British Overseas Territory and has not been given permission as yet to accede to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and participation in the CARICOM Single Market.
38 Central American Integration System.
40 Members of CELAC: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System  
Barbados Montserrat and Trinidad and Tobago are not member of Petrocaribe  
These factors are not all-encompassing but are listed here are the new ‘existential threats’ that the regional project currently faces for other factors (see Matthew Louis Bishop et al., ‘Caribbean Regional Integration,’ UWI Institute for International Relations (2011): 50.  
Niemann and Schmitter, ‘Neo-functionalism,’ 2.  
The four Councils are: the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP); the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED); the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR); and the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD).  
The three bodies are: the Legal Affairs Committee, which provides legal advice to the organs and bodies of the Community; the Budget Committee, which examines the draft budget, work program of the CARICOM Secretariat, and submits recommendations to the Community Council; and the Committee of Central Bank Governors, which provides recommendations to the COFAP on monetary and financial matters.  
Heckscher and Donnellon, The Post-bureaucratic Organization, 1994  
Suriname is a member of this grouping  
Abugattas, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl, 2004  
Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Trans-regionalism,’ 2003.  
Julie Gilson, ‘New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia,’ Journal of European Integration, 27 (2005), 307–326.  
Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Trans-regionalism,’ 2003.  
The Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development,’ 2003, 1.
67 The 1973 Treaty called for the removal of duties on intra-regional trade and placed high-tariffs on imports from third countries.
68 Jules, 'Neither World Polity,' 2012.
69 The political differences between member states stemmed from their differing economic and political beliefs. This pluralism led to the socialist experiments in Guyana, guided by Prime Minister Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham from 1966–1980 and President from 1980–1985; Jamaica, aided by Prime Minister Michael Norman Manley from 1972–1980; and Grenada, under Prime Minister Maurice Rupert Bishop from 1979–1983.
74 Jessop, 'Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,' 336.
75 Jessop, 'Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,' 333.
76 Task Force on Functional Cooperation, 2008 'Final report of the Task Force on Functional Cooperation,' Georgetown: CARICOM.
78 Jules, 'New Mutualism' in micro-states,' 278.
79 Schiff and Winters, 'Regional Integration,' 147.
81 Intensified functional cooperation is driven by interdependence and gave rise to greater sectoral harmonization since it aims coordinate policies, procedures, and practices through defined principles of efficiency and effectiveness across the region to allow for greater economic integration. Efficiency or ‘hard principles’ reflect the tangible economic results that were the efficacy of functional cooperation. Principles of effectiveness, the ‘soft principles’ of intensified functional cooperation, were deviations based upon the human elements and a common identity fostered by functional cooperation. (see Tavis D. Jules, ‘Re/thinking Harmonization in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Audiences, Actors, Interests, and Educational Policy Formation,’ Unpublished Ph.D, diss., (Teachers College, Columbia University, 2008).; Jules, 'Neither World Polity,' 2012.
82 Anneke Jessen, ‘CARICOM Report # 2’ (Buenos Aires: Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), 2005).
83 Jessen, 'Buenos Aires,' 19